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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DUANE ARNOLD BROWN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 990874-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of sexual abuse of a child, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does a witness improperly testify regarding the truthfulness of a child victim 
of sexual abuse, in violation of Utah R. Evid. 608(a), when that witness 
testifies about her own behavior during the child victim's interview? 
2. Did the State produce sufficient evidence to establish that defendant 
took indecent liberties with, and thereby sexually abused a child, when 
the child testified that defendant directed her to lay next to him on a 
couch and then defendant unzipped his shorts, exposed his penis, and 
rubbed his penis against her clothed leg? 
Because defendant did not preserve either issue, this Court reviews only for plain 
error. State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, 1 20, 5 P.3d 642; State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 
16,10P.3d346. 
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STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute and rule are set forth in Addendum A.-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999) (sexual abuse of a child).l 
Utah R. Evid. 608. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999) (R. 13). A jury found defendant guilty as 
charged (R. 59-60, 66-69). Defendant timely appealed (R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
THE CRIME . • 
Sometime during the spring or summer of 1998, eight-year-old Jessica went to visit 
her friend Victoria, defendant's stepdaughter (R. 86: 116,122-23, 163-64, 170).3 The two 
planned to run through the sprinklers (Id.). Jessica's mother drove her to Victoria's 
grandmother's home (R. 86: 116,145). For some reason, Jessica and Victoria left the 
grandmother's home and went to defendant's nearby home (R. 86: 116-17, 177-78). They 
began watching a Disney movie with defendant (R. 86: 116-17, 177-78). Victoria left during 
the movie to visit another friend across the street (R. 86: 118-20, 133-34). 
1
 Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 has been amended since the time of the 
offenses, the amended portions are not material to the issues in this appeal. The State 
therefore cites to the most recent version of the statute. 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Holgate, 
2000UT74,f2. 
3
 To improve clarity while protecting the anonymity of the children involved, the 
State has chosen to use the children's first names only. Neither child shares defendant's last 
name. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Now alone with Jessica, defendant directed her to lay next to him on the couch (R. 86: 
118, 120). Jessica complied (R. 86: 120). Defendant then unzipped his shorts, exposed his 
penis, and rubbed it against Jessica's clothed leg (R. 86: 119, 120-21, 125, 137-38, 141). 
Jessica stood up in shock because she didn't want this to happen to her (R. 86: 120, 121). 
Defendant then instructed Jessica to go find Victoria (R. 86: 120, 121-22, 134-35). Jessica 
found Victoria at the friend's house across the street (R. 86: 118-22, 133-34). The two 
returned to defendant's home where they played darts in Victoria's room (R. 86: 120, 135). 
Jessica's mother picked her up about half an hour later (R. 86: 137). Jessica never played 
with Victoria again (R. 86: 162-63). 
During this same summer Jessica's behavior suddenly changed (R. 86: 149). She 
began vomiting without reason (R. 86: 147, 161-62). She also became very bossy towards 
her younger brother (R. 86: 147). Jessica's vomiting episodes stopped after she testified at 
the preliminary hearing (R. 86: 150). 
THE INTERVIEWS 
In October of 1998, Hurricane Police Detective Shane Copeland learned that 
defendant may have sexually abused Jessica; he contacted her mother to set up an interview 
at the Children's Justice Center (R. 86: 61, 63-64). Jessica's first interview took place on 28 
October 1999 (R. 86: 66). Detective Copeland and Julie Willden, a social worker with the 
Division of Child and Family Services, interviewed Jessica (R. 86: 66,101-03,123-24). 
Jessica had never met her interviewers before and was not sure why they were interviewing 
her (R. 86: 123-24). During the interview Detective Copeland asked Jessica whether 
something happened that made her feel uncomfortable or yucky (R. 86: 80). Jessica 
responded, "No" (Id.). Jessica also responded negatively when asked whether "something 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
happen[ed] to anybody in the house that made [her] feel uncomfortable?" (Id.). Detective 
Copeland concluded the interview as unsubstantiated (R. 86: 76). I 
Jessica's behavior during the interview suggested that she didn't want to talk about 
the subject (R. 86: 70). At the beginning of the interview Jessica was talkative and outgoing 
(R. 86: 67). Her demeanor changed as Detective Copeland questioned her about whether 
anything happened that would have made her feel uncomfortable, or specifically about 
Victoria (R. 86: 69). Jessica would not look at her interviewers, she also bowed her head, 1 
hesitated, and shrugged her shoulders when answering (R. 86: 69-70, 93-95). Jessica seemed 
happier after Detective Copeland told her that the interview was over (R. 86: 70-71). 
I 
After the first interview Detective Copeland told Jessica's mother that he was still 
concerned and encouraged her to contact him if Jessica ever mentioned the abuse (R. 86: 71). 
He cautioned her, however, about confronting Jessica, or asking Jessica leading questions (R. j 
86:71). 
A few days after the first interview, Jessica wrote on a piece of paper that she had 
seen something and handed the paper to her mother (R. 86: 148-49). She asked her mother 
whether she had to talk about it, and then explained the details of her abuse (R. 86: 149). 
Jessica's mother contacted Detective Copeland and he set up a second interview (R. 86:71 - -
72). Jessica explained to her mother that she didn't disclose the abuse during the first 
interview because she was scared (R. 86: 149). At trial, Jessica explained that she didn't 
immediately tell her mother about the sexual abuse because she thought she was going to get 
in trouble (R. 86: 141). 
Jessica disclosed the abuse during the second interview (R. 86: 72-73). Both 
Detective Copeland and Ms. Willden testified that, in their experience, it was not unusual for 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a child victim to withhold information in the first interview and then disclose sexual abuse 
during the second interview (R. 86: 72-73, 104-05). As Ms. Willden explained, child victims 
often do not disclose sexual abuse until they develop a trust with the interviewer (R. 86: 105). 
THE TRIAL 
In addition to the above evidence, the jury also heard the following testimony at trial. 
The prosecutor asked Detective Copeland, "Okay. Now, you mentioned something about you 
told parents you don't want them asking leading questions. Can you explain to the jury what 
you mean by that?" (R. 86: 67). Detective Copeland explained: 
We don't want the children to be led by a question. For example, if I would 
say a defendant's name, has the defendant done this to you, they might take 
that as saying, yes, that would make me happy, or saying yes to a parent, yes, 
that's what happened. So we don't want to lead them to think that they are 
trying to make us happy by saying something happened to them. So we want 
them to be able to tell us what happened without us leading them to tell us 
what happened. 
(R. 86: 68) (a copy of this portion of Detective Copeland's testimony is included in 
Addendum B). 
On cross-examination defense counsel asked Ms. Willden, "Isn't it also true, Miss 
Willden, that sometimes a child will say something that isn't true, isn't factual because they 
want to please someone and they are saying what they believe they are expected to say?" (R. 
86: 108-09). Ms. Willden acknowledged that was true (R. 86: 109). On redirect the 
prosecutor asked: 
Q. With respect to that last question, do you know of anything that would 
have led Jessica to believe that she was trying to please you? 
A. No. There is absolutely no motive, motives. 
Q. Okay. Did you lead her in any way or suggest that she may have been 
abused or any of the specifics about that? 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. No. 
Q. Did you know any of the specifics until she told you? 
A. I didn't. 
(R. 86: 109) (a complete copy of Ms. Willden's testimony is included in Addendum C). 
Following the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that 
the State had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of sexual abuse 
of a child (R. 86: 166-67). Specifically, defendant argued that the evidence merely 
established lewdness involving a child, not that he had taken indecent liberties with Jessica 
and therefore sexually abused her (Id.). The trial court denied the motion (R. 86: 167). 
Defendant proceeded to put on his evidence (R. 86: 169-89). Defendant testified that he did 
not abuse Jessica although he remembered Jessica visiting Victoria, and the three of them 
watching a movie in his home (R. 86: 177-80). Defendant could not think of any reason why 
Jessica would have been mad at him, or would have made things up about him (R. 86: 185). 
Defendant did not renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence, nor did he 
move for an arrest of judgment or a new trial (R. 61-86, 86: 190-229). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither Detective Copeland nor Ms. Willden testified as to the truthfulness of a 
witness on a particular occasion in violation of Utah R. Evid. 608(a). Detective Copeland 
generally explained the problems inherent in asking leading questions of any child victim of 
sexual abuse. His testimony was not a comment on credibility and did not even refer 
specifically to Jessica. Ms. Willden testified about her own behavior during Jessica's 
interview. She did not testify about Jessica's behavior or state an improper conclusion about 
Jessica's credibility. Even if Ms. Willden's testimony could be construed as a comment on 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jessica's credibility, the testimony was ambiguous. Any error, therefore, was not obvious to 
the trial court. 
This Court should refuse to consider the sufficiency issue because defendant failed to 
adequately brief the issue or properly marshal the evidence. Regardless, the evidence amply 
supports the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. NEITHER DETECTIVE COPELAND NOR MS. WILLDEN 
TESTIFIED AS TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE VICTIM 
ON A PARTICULAR OCCASION 
Defendant asserts that Detective Copeland and Ms. Willden improperly testified at 
trial about Jessica's credibility during her interview at the Children's Justice Center. Br. of 
Appellant at 3-5. 
Because defendant did not object to either witness's testimony, this Court reviews for 
plain error. See State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42,120, 5 P.3d 642. To establish plain error 
defendant must show that: 1) an error exists; 2) the error was obvious; and 3) the error was 
harmful. Id (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). An error is harmful 
if the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error sufficiently undermines 
confidence in the verdict. Id (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)). 
A. Rule 608(a) forbids witnesses from expressing an opinion 
about a victim's truthfulness on a particular occasion. 
Pursuant to rule 608(a), a witness may not testify "as to the truthfulness of a witness 
on a particular occasion." State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989). Although 
Rimmasch addressed this issue in the context of expert witnesses, this Court has since held 
that the same rule applies to lay testimony. See State v. Stefaniak. 900 P.2d 1094, 1095 n.3, 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1096 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Rule 608(a) draws no distinction between lay and expert 
witnesses."). 
In Rimmasch, the objectionable testimony came from an expert who interviewed the 
child victim. 775 P.2d at 392-93. The prosecutor asked the expert to explain the basis for her 
opinion that the victim had been sexually abused. Id at 392. The expert responded, "Well, 
specifically, in my opinion, one does not give this kind of information with the amount of 
details and the amount of clarity unless one has experienced it." Id at 392-93. On redirect 
the prosecutor asked the expert "to explain what the daughter had to gain by accusing her 
father of sexual abuse." Id at 393. The expert stated: 
One of the things that we do when we are doing a clinical interview and 
looking at the reality of the statements is to consider the alternative 
hypothesis, which is that the individual is not telling the truth; and based on 
the richness of the detail and the uniqueness of some of the incidents that she 
described, I can't see that - well, then, if you would consider the alternative 
that [the daughter] is not telling the truth, then you would have to look at the 
consequences of the lie and what - why she would lie. And in talking with 
[the daughter] and reviewing her test data, I think she has only to lose 
[S]o I don't know what she would have to gain. 
Id. (alteration in original). The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court violated rule 
608(a) by admitting "a direct opinion on the [victim's] truthfulness at the time she made her 
allegations of abuse." Id. 
In Stefaniak. the offending testimony came from a social worker who interviewed a 
child victim concerning allegations that her father had committed lewdness. 900 P.2d at 
1094-95. Although the social worker did not testify as an expert, he commented on the 
victim's demeanor during the interview, stating, "She was a fairly normal child for her age. 
She was pretty open in her responses to my questions. She volunteered information readily. 
She seemed to be quite candid about what she was telling me." Id at 1095. This Court 
8 
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concluded that the prosecutor improperly elicited this testimony to suggest that the victim 
"was an open, honest, and credible witness." Id. This Court found the testimony 
inadmissible under rule 608(a) because it intruded upon the factfinder's responsibility to 
determine witness credibility. Id. at 1095-96. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court found that a detective's testimony that the victim 
did not appear coached violated rule 608. State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, f20, 5 P.3d 642. The 
court also found that the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Id. In Adams, the 
defense suggested that someone had coached the mentally-retarded victim's testimony. Id at 
H 6. In response, the State elicited testimony from the detective who interviewed the victim, 
and stated that, in his opinion, the victim did not appear to be coached. Id. 
Each of the above examples shares a common element: the offending testimony did 
not concern extrinsic facts, rather it contained improper conclusions about a victim's 
credibility based on speculation about the victim's state of mind or inferences from the 
victim's demeanor during a previous interview. In Rimmasch, the expert's testimony 
"focused on the reasons why [she] thought the daughter was telling the truth." 775 P.2d at 
393 (emphasis added). In Stefaniak. the witness testified that the victim "was pretty open . . . 
volunteered information readily... [and] seemed to be quite candid." 900 P.2d at 1095 
(emphasis added). The detective in Adams, testified that the victim did not appear to him to 
have been coached. 2000 UT 42, J 6 (emphasis added). 
B. Detective Copeland and Ms. Willden testified about 
extrinsic matters, not about Jessica's credibility. 
Here, neither Detective Copeland nor Ms. Willden stated improper conclusions about 
Jessica's credibility based on speculation about her state of mind, or inferences from her 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
demeanor. Rather, Detective Copeland merely explained why leading questions were 
problematic when interviewing a child victim of sexual abuse (R. 86: 67-68) add. B, and Ms. 
Willden testified about her own knowledge and behavior, not Jessica's (R. 86: 108-09) add. 
c
-
Detective Copeland. Defendant cites the following exchange between the prosecutor 
and Detective Copeland: 
Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned something about you told parents you 
don't want them asking leading questions. Can you explain to the jury what 
you mean by that? 
A. We don't want the children to be led by a question. For example, if I 
would say a defendant's name, has the defendant done this to you, they might 
take that as saying, yes, that would make me happy, or saying yes to a parent, 
yes, that's what happened. So we don't want to lead them to think that they 
are trying to make us happy by saying something happened to them. So we 
want them to be able to tell us what happened without us leading them to tell 
us what happened. 
(R. 86: 67-68) add. B. 
This testimony does not concern "the truthfulness of a witness on a particular 
occasion." See Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 392 (emphasis added). Detective Copeland did not 
comment on Jessica's truthfulness. In fact, this testimony did not refer to Jessica at all. 
Rather, Detective Copeland spoke generally about the problems inherent in asking leading 
questions of any child victim of sexual abuse. As defendant acknowledges, "Detective 
Copeland is not specifically referring to the questions asked in the [victim's interview]." Br. 
of Appellant at 5. Detective Copeland's testimony, therefore, did not violate rule 608(a). 
Ms. Willden. Defendant also asserts that Ms. Willden testified improperly. Br. of 
Appellant at 4. He cites the following testimony: 
10 
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Q. With respect to that last question, do you know of anything that would have 
led Jessica to believe that she was trying to please you? 
A. No. There is absolutely no motive, motives. 
Q. Okay. Did you lead her in any way or suggest that she may have been abused 
or any of the specifics about that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know any of the specifics until she told you? 
A. I didn't. 
(R. 86: 109) add. C. The answers to each of these questions are all proper testimony. 
The first question is ambiguous on its face. One could reasonably understand the 
question to ask whether Ms. Willden knew of anything that would have led Jessica to believe 
that she could please Ms. Willden by fabricating her answers. One could also understand the 
question to ask whether Ms. Willden knew of anything that led her to believe that Jessica was 
fabricating her answers to please Ms. Willden. The nature of the question becomes clearer, 
however, when it is read in the context of defense counsel's preceding question: 
Q. Isn't it also true, Miss Willden, that sometimes a child will say 
something that isn't true, isn't factual because they want to please someone 
and they are saying what they believe they are expected to say? 
A. That's true. 
(R. 86: 108-09) add. C. This exchange was designed to leave the impression that Jessica may 
have fabricated her answers because she believe Ms. Willden expected her to do so. 
The prosecutor merely followed up on this line of questioning to dispel this false 
impression. He asked Ms. Willden, "do you know of anything that would have led Jessica to 
believe that she was trying to please you?" (R. 86: 109) add. C. In context, the meaning of 
this question is apparent: "do you know of anything that would have communicated to Jessica 
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that she could please you by fabricating her answers?" The prosecutor's question and Ms. 
Willden's answer thus focused on Ms. Willden's knowledge and behavior, rather than her 
opinion of Jessica's truthfulness. 
Testimony about extrinsic facts that may have influenced a witness's testimony is 
precisely the type of information that helps a jury evaluate credibility. Such testimony is 
admissible under rule 608. For example, evidence that the State has granted a witness 
immunity in exchange for his testimony is particularly important to the jury. State v. 
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985). Likewise, a majority of federal courts have held 
that evidence that the prosecution entered into a plea agreement with a cooperating witness is 
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(a).4 United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 
1990). This evidence is helpful because it "enables the jury to more accurately assess the 
witness's credibility." Id, 
Such evidence is especially appropriate where defense counsel opens the door to such 
evidence by questioning the behavior of one witness in an attempt to challenge another 
witness's credibility. For example, in United States v. Gauvin. 173 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 
1999), a prosecution witness, Officer Sandoval, prepared a report explaining why she fired 
her weapon at a fleeing vehicle during a high-speed chase. Defense counsel asked Officer 
Sandoval's superior, Officer Segotta, whether he "talk[ed] personally to Officer Sandoval to 
question her about anything she wrote in her report?" Id. The exchange suggested that 
Officer Segotta may have suspected some impropriety in Officer Sandoval's report and 
4
 Utah R. Evid. 608(a) is the Federal Rule verbatim. Utah R. Evid. 608(a) 
advisory committee's note. Utah courts may look to federal court interpretation of the federal 
rules to aid in interpreting the Utah rules. State v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 324 n.2 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (quoting State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200 n. 3 (Utah 1989)). 
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confronted her about it. On redirect, however, Officer Segotta testified that he found no 
improper motive in Officer Sandoval's report. Id The defendant argued that this testimony 
improperly vouched for the credibility of Officer Sandoval. IdL The Tenth Circuit found the 
testimony was proper because defendant's counsel opened the door to the line of questioning. 
Ii 
Thus, a witness may testify about their own knowledge or behavior when defense 
counsel suggests that their previous behavior undermines another witness's credibility. For 
example, if defense counsel asks witness "A" whether cooperating witnesses sometimes 
fabricate testimony in order to receive a favorable plea agreement - thus suggesting that 
witness "A" may have made such an agreement with a cooperating witness in the case - then 
the prosecutor may ask witness "A" whether he did, in fact, offer a plea agreement to the 
cooperating witness in exchange for his testimony. 
That is precisely what happened in the instant case. Defense counsel's question 
suggested that Ms. Willden's behavior undermined the credibility of Jessica's answers during 
the interview. The question suggested that Ms. Willden expected Jessica to implicate 
defendant and did something, or knew of some extrinsic fact, that communicated her 
expectation to Jessica. Responding to the implication of defense counsel's question, the 
prosecutor asked Ms. Willden whether she knew of any extrinsic fact that may have 
communicated to Jessica that she expected Jessica to implicate defendant (R. 86: 109) add. C. 
Ms. Willden responded that she did not (Id,). 
Ms. Willden's remaining testimony is also proper. The testimony that Ms. Willden 
did not ask Jessica leading questions again focused on Ms. Willden's behavior rather than 
Jessica's. The testimony established that Ms. Willden conducted the interview appropriately. 
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Ms. Willden stated an extrinsic fact about the manner in which she asked Jessica questions. 
She did not state a speculative conclusion about Jessica's credibility based on the manner in 
which Jessica answered those questions. 
Finally, Ms. Willden's statement that she did not know the specific details of the 
sexual abuse until she interviewed Jessica does not constitute even an implicit comment on 
Jessica's credibility during the interview. As with the above testimony, it is a proper 
statement of fact. 
Because neither Detective Copeland nor Ms. Willden testified as to Jessica's 
truthfulness on a particular occasion, no error occurred. Defendant therefore fails to satisfy 
the first prong of the plain error analysis. See Adams, 2000 UT 42, f 20. 
Assuming without conceding that Ms. Willden's testimony about Jessica's motivation 
to please her was improper, the error was not obvious to the trial court. The prosecutor's 
question to Ms. Willden is grammatically incorrect and thus ambiguous. See State v. Baker, 
963 p.2d 801, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the plain error doctrine should not 
apply when the challenged remarks were ambiguous and there was no settled case law 
directly addressing the issue). Even without ambiguity in the testimony "[i]t can be a subtle 
business to determine whether a particular opinion, based only in part on an appraisal of 
veracity, runs afoul of rule 608(a) and is therefore flatly inadmissible." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
at 392. Given the ambiguous nature of the testimony at issue in this case, any error would not 
have been obvious to the trial court. Defendant's claim therefore fails the second prong of 
the plain error analysis. See Adams, 2000 UT 42, K 20. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
Br. of Appellant at 1. This Court should not consider the merits of this issue, however, 
because defendant has inadequately briefed the issue and has not properly marshaled the 
evidence as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The rule provides: 
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). 
A. Defendant has not adequately briefed the issue or 
marshaled the evidence. 
Although defendant lists a sufficiency issue in his statement of issues, he does not 
discuss the issue in his brief. Compare Br. of Appellant at 1, with Br. of Appellant at 2-6. 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict as required by Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9). In fact, his brief lacks the required statement of the facts with record citations. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Defendant does cite to four pages of the 229 page trial 
transcript. Br. of Appellant at 5-6. Defendant includes this cursory discussion about a few 
morsels of evidence in his analysis of the rule 608 issue, however. He fails to discuss the 
evidence from a sufficiency standpoint or even mention any of the evidence supporting his 
conviction. Br. of Appellant at 1-6. Nor does defendant endeavor to demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346. Because defendant fails to marshal the evidence or 
otherwise adequately brief the sufficiency issue, this Court should decline to consider the 
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sufficiency issue. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ct. App. 305, ffl[ 25, 27, 989 P.2d 503 
(refusing to consider inadequately briefed issue and specifically refusing to consider 
sufficiency issue where defendant failed to marshal the evidence). 
B. The evidence amply supports the jury's verdict. 
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will reverse 
only when, "after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is 'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" as to the 
defendant's guilt. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 
(Utah 1993)). 
The jury convicted defendant of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999). (R. 59-60, 66). "A person commits sexual 
abuse of a child if... the actor... otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child . . . with the 
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 
(1999). 
The Court need not look far to find evidence establishing defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Jessica testified that after defendant directed her to lay on the couch next 
to him, he unzipped his shorts, exposed his penis, and rubbed it against her leg. Eight year 
old Jessica was playing at defendant's home, under his supervision when he abused her. She 
repeated the details of her abuse to her mother, Detective Copeland and Ms. Willden (See 
Statement of Facts at 3,4-5). Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer that Jessica had 
been abused from the evidence that during the summer of 1998 she suddenly began vomiting 
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for no reason and became unusually bossy towards her younger brother (See Statement of 
Facts at 3). This evidence amply supports the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this f^ day of January, 2001. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
lstooKer D. Ballard 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ d a y of January, 2001,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
two accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Douglas D. Terry 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, UT 84770 
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Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, 
but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-exami-
nation of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to 
credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivi-
sions (a) and (b) are the federal rule, verbatim, 
and are comparable to Rules 22 and 6, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), except to the extent 
that Subdivision (a) limits such evidence to 
credibility for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) al-
lowed a broader attack on the character of a 
witness as to truth, honesty and integrity. 
This rule should be read in conjunction with 
Rule 405. Subdivision (b) allows, in the discre-
tion of the court on cross-examination, inquiry 
into specific instances of the witness's conduct 
relative to his character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness or specific instances of conduct 
of a person as to whom the witness has pro* 
vided character testimony. See, State v. Adams, 
26 Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 (1971). Attack 
upon a witness's credibility by specific in-
stances of character other than conviction of a 
crime is inadmissible under current Utah law. 
Cf. Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 R2d 190 (Utah 
1975); Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Allowing cross-examination of a witness as to 
specific instances affecting character for truth-
fulness is new to Utah practice and in accord 
with the decision in Michelson v. United.States, 
335 U.S. 469 (1948). The cross-examination of a 
character witness as to specific instances of 
conduct which the character witness may have 
heard about concerning the person whose char-
acter is placed in evidence has been sanctioned 
by a prior decision, State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 
(Utah 1981). 
The rule is subject to a witness invoking the 
statutory privilege against degradation con-
tained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
24-9 (1953). See, In re Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 27, 
386 P.2d 726 (1963). The privilege, however, 
may be subject to limitation to accommodate an 
accused's right of confrontation. Cf. Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
Subdivision (c) is Rule 608(c), Military Rules 
of Evidence, verbatim. 
Cross-References. — Privilege against self-
incrimination and degradation of character, 
§ 78-24-9. 
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very important that you merely take the evidence in, 
try and remember what you hear and see, but do not 
draw any conclusions until everything has been 
presented to you by both sides. 
We will try and move this case along today. 
It's not going to be a complex or a lengthy case. But 
I submit to you that everything you hear today could 
be very important in your deliberations. So I ask you 
to be attentive and if someone is not speaking up, 
bring that to the attention of the court. Sometimes 
we as attorneys, we may turn, or our voice may trail 
off, or if you don't, you may not hear something from 
one of the witnesses. It's important that you hear 
what is going to be presented today. And, again, I 
thank you for your service today. 
(Court reading instructions again.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Langston, you may call your 
first witness. 
MR. LANGSTON: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll 
call Detective Copeland. 
THE COURT: Mr. Copeland, if you'll come 
forward and be sworn, sir. 
DET. SHANE COPELAND, 
called by PLAINTIFF, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testifies as follows: 
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THE COURT: Thank you. Please have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LANG'STON: 
Q Would you please state your name and where you 
are employed. 
A Shane Copeland. Hurricane Police Department. 
Q What are your duties with the Hurricane Police 
Department? 
A I am a full time detective. I handle a 
assortment of crimes, including burglaries, robberies, 
thefts, sexual abuse, child abuse cases, physical 
abuse. 
0 I grew up in Hurricane. I don't think we had 
as many back then. How long have you been with the 
Hurricane Police Department? 
A It will be 10 years in January. 
Q This case today that we have is a case 
involving sexual abuse of a child. Have you had any 
training with, in investigating that particular area? 
A Yes, I have. 
0 Will you tell the jury about that. 
A I have a list of training here. I have had 
approximately up to 200 hours of training on abuse 
crimes and of child, sexual and physical abuse crimes 
and ritual abuse. 
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Q Here in Utah as well as other places? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Out of state as well? 
A I have been to San Diego, California and also 
Hawaii on some training. 
0 I would assume that, as part of your duties 
then, you have had occasion to interview numerous 
child witnesses? 
A That is correct. 
Q In that capacity as a detective, last -- the 
end of October of last year, were you involved in an 
investigation of the defendant, Duane Brown? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And, in that capacity, did the name of Jessica 
Nielsen as a possible victim come up? 
A She did. 
0 What is your general protocol once you, if you 
receive information that a particular child may have 
been victimized by someone else, what is your normal 
procedure? 
A If we gain some information that there might 
be a child victim out there, we, as soon as possible, 
try to get ahold of their family members, their 
parents, if the child is obviously a minor, and set up 
an interview, initial interview to talk to the child. 
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Q Now, this information that you received from, 
about Jessica, did that come from Jessica or from 
somewhere else? 
A Somewhere else. 
Q And after you, your investigation, and is 
there a place that you will set up to do interviews? 
A We do interviews in several places. We try, 
because of Washington County has a Children's Justice 
Center in St. George which is set up for interviewing 
children. And we try to get to that place. If any 
way possible to do it, we do it there. 
Q Describe a little more what the Children's 
Justice Center is. 
A It's a home that's set up for child victims of 
physical or sexual abuse. We have rooms that are set 
up there with cameras in them that are hidden so the 
child can't, is not staring right at a camera, and a 
microphone in there. And it's designed to make them 
feel like they are at home and not a police station or 
an attorney's office. Designed to make them feel like 
they are at home in a safe place when they are talking 
to us. 
Q Okay. Do you do those interviews alone or 
with someone else? 
A We do them with someone else. 
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Q Who is that? 
A We do them with Department of Family Services 
out of Washington County here. 
Q Why is that? 
A We do it -- first of all, I'm doing the part 
of the criminal investigation. And they are doing 
their part of if the child needs any social care, any 
welfare. They do their part and I do my part. 
Q Okay. And, by working together, can you cut 
down on the number of interviews that need to be done? 
A That's correct. 
Q After you receive the information that 
Jessica --or Jessica Nielsen's name, did you contact 
her parents? 
A I contacted her mother. 
Q Okay. Do you remember about when that took 
place? 
A I believe I contacted her on October 28th, was 
the day I actually talked to her. 
Q Last year? 
A Of last year. 
0 And what did you do in that conversation? 
What did you tell her? 
A I told her that her daughter's name was 
brought up in part of my investigation. And I would 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
like to set an appointment with them at the Children': 
Justice Center to interview her daughter. 
Q At'• that point, did you have any specific • 
information or just a name? 
A Just a name. 
Q Did you give Jessica's mother, Patricia, I 
believe --
A Yes. 
Q -- did you give her any instructions with 
respect to talking to Jessica? 
A I did. 
Q What did you tell her? 
A I told Patricia that, who I was and described 
what I did for a living. I said it's very important 
that, don't run to her daughter Jessica and say, hey, 
Detective Copeland is coming here asking some 
questions. I said, actually, don't ask her any 
questions. Just tell her that we would like to talk 
to her and that she's not in trouble, but we would 
like to spend a few minutes with her and talk to her. 
But don't ask her any questions or don't tell her why 
I'm there to talk to her daughter. 
Q Why do you do that? 
A We don't want the parents to get involved and 
really leading or telling the kids, say, hey, the 
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police are coming. They think you have been abused or 
they think something's happened to you. We don't want 
the parents to try to get involved with the child, 
interviewing the child before we have an opportunity. 
So this way, hopefully, the child won't be tainted by 
what the parents might be thinking so we can do the 
first interview. 
0 When did you set up your first interview? 
A It was set up for October 30th of 1998. 
Q At the Children's Justice Center? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that when the interview was conducted? 
A That is correct. 
Q Who was present at that interview? 
A I was present. Julie Willden from Department 
of Family Service and Jessica Nielsen. 
0 Okay. When you conduct the interviews, are 
the parents normally in the room with the child? 
A No, they are not. We ask, we actually keep 
the parents out if we* can, any way possible; again, so 
the child can't rely on the parents1 information and 
knowledge. Just so we can have the child's 
information only. 
Q When you began to talk to Jessica, how did you 
do that? 
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A Basically, we started talking to her. We 
introduced ourselves. I told her who I was. And I 
was a police officer for Hurricane Police Department. 
And Julie told her that she did. And we told her that 
we are kid helpers. And we explained to her that she 
was not in trouble even though a police officer was 
present. And we are just here to help kids. And 
that's our job. 
Q Why do you explain that they are not in 
trouble? 
A Urn, a lot of times when people thought the 
police, they think they are in trouble instantly. And 
children, a lot of times, thinks they are in trouble 
when they have to talk to the police officer, thinking 
maybe they have done something wrong. 
Q Okay. What was Jessica's demeanor like when 
you began to talk with her? 
A Jessica was very sweet. She was a real 
sweetheart. She talked. Very outgoing. Talked about 
her schools. She liked to draw. What she did at 
school. Pretty much outgoing girl. 
0 Okay. Now, you mentioned something about you 
told parents you don't want them asking leading 
questions. Can you explain to the jury what you mean 
by that? 
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A We don't want the children to be led by a 
question. For example, if I would say a defendant's 
name, has the defendant done this to you, they might 
take that as saying, yes, that would make me happy, or 
saying yes to.a parent, yes, that's what happened. So 
we don't want to lead them to think that they are 
trying to make us happy by saying something happened 
to them. So we want them to be able to tell us what 
happened without us leading them to tell us what 
happened. 
Q And is that the procedure that you follow when 
you do these interviews in the Children's Justice 
Center? 
A That is correct. 
Q Does that make it difficult, sometimes if, 
particularly if the child doesn't know why she is 
there? 
A That makes it real difficult. 
Q In that first interview, was the defendant's 
name ever brought up? 
A No, it wasn't. 
Q Now, after becoming comfortable with Jessica, 
asking some of the general questions, what did you do 
next? 
A After we talked to her quite a while, we 
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questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Terry, do you want to cross? 
MR. TERRY: Yes, briefly. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TERRY: 
Q How do you spell your last name? 
A It's W-i-1-l-d-e-n. 
Q I didn't know if it was W-i or W-e. 
Miss Willden? 
A Yes. 
Q Miss Willden, you indicated^that one of the 
reasons that the child may initially say something 
didn't happen, and then later say that something did 
happen is because of some type of a threat. Is that 
accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q That's not the case in this case, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You are aware of that? 
A Yes. 
Q You are aware that Jessica has testified that 
no one told her not to say anything? 
A According to my transcript, there was mention 
that she had been told not to talk about it. 
Q Your transcript of what? 
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A Of the interview. 
Q Okay. And are you aware that in the 
preliminary hearing that was held in this case when 
she testified in court under oath that she testified 
she had never been told not to tell anyone? 
A I wasn't aware of that. 
0 Okay. I guess one of the other reasons that 
initially a child may not say or say that nothing 
happened is in fact because nothing happened, that 
could also be the reason, couldn't it? 
A Yes. 
0 I'm sure in your profession, you are of the 
opinion that there may be instances of child abuse 
that are never reported? 
A Yes. 
Q On the other hand, you would have to agree 
with me, would you not, that some instances of child 
abuse that are reported are, in fact, not true? 
A Yes. 
MR. TERRY: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Langston? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LANGSTON: 
Q When something is reported and not true, are 
there usually some reasons for that? 
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A Yes. 
Q Such as? 
A Sometimes custody battles, we'll get a false 
report. It's very rare that the child would lie about 
something like that. But it does happen. 
Q If the child were mad at someone, could that 
be a reason for a false report? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q If child -- is it your experience that 
children will sometimes tell a lie to get out of 
trouble or to get into trouble? 
A Probably to get out of trouble. 
Q Okay. Do they ever tell a lie to get into 
what they think would get them into trouble? 
A No. 
Q Okay. In these, this situation, when you were 
talking with Jessica, do you tell them that they are 
not in any trouble? 
A Yes. 
MR. LANGSTON: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Terry? 
MR. TERRY: Briefly, Your Honor. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TERRY: 
Q Isn't it also true, Miss Willden, that 
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sometimes a child will say something that isn't true, 
isn't factual because they want to please someone and 
they are saying what they believe they are expected to 
say? 
A That's true. 
• . MR. TERRY: Nothing else. 
THE COURT: Mr. Terry? I'm sorry. 
Mr. Langston. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LANGSTON: 
Q With respect to that question, do you know of 
anything that would have led Jessica to believe that 
she was trying to please you? 
A No. There is absolutely no motive, motives. 
Q Okay. Did you lead her in any way or suggest 
that she may have been abused or any of the specifics 
about that? 
A No. 
0 Did you know any of the specifics until she 
told you? 
A I didn't. 
MR. LANGSTON: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Terry, anything else? 
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RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TERRY: 
Q Miss Willden, if we have two interviews of a 
child such as we have in this case, one the result of 
the interview is basically that the child says that 
nothing happened, so it's unsubstantiated as 
determined by the detective. Then a subsequent 
interview where the child comes forth with details, 
isn't it true that it's possible that by some means, 
by some third-party, information has come to that 
child in between the two interviews, and that the 
child in the second interview is merely telling you 
what they have been told rather than what actually 
happened to them? I mean, that's a possibility in 
that scenario; is it not? 
A Yes. 
MR- TERRY: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Langston, anything more? All 
right. Thank you, Miss Willden, you may step down. 
Your next witness, counsel. 
MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, we are at noon. 
And my next witness will be Jessica. 
THE COURT: How long do you anticipate it 
might take? Should we go before the lunch recess or 
would it be better to go after? / 
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